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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, 
Petitioner, 
- and- CASE NO. CP-632 
RYE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (DAREN J. RYLEWICZ of 
counsel), for Petitioner 
SHAW & PERELSON, LLP (JAY M. SIEGEL of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the Rye City School District 
(District) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granting the unit 
clarification portion of a unit clarification/unit placement petition filed by the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). 
FACTS 
Prior to 1994, the District employed five teacher assistants who were assigned 
as computer laboratory assistants (hereinafter, lab assistant). The lab assistants were 
in the unit represented by CSEA, which included teacher aides, academic intervention 
intern and academic intervention intern coordinator. The District's elementary, middle 
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and high schools functioned with free-standing computers located in computer 
laboratories in each school. There was no integrated technology plan until 1994, when 
the District adopted a two-phase technology plan, at a total cost of about 3.5 million 
dollars. 
The first phase of the plan took place from 1994-1996. The District installed 
approximately 300 work stations and three file servers into the middle school. Also, 
three new computer laboratories were developed and computers throughout the 
classrooms and administrative offices were networked. A local network was constructed 
in the middle school. 
The second phase took place during the period of 1996-1998. Similar 
improvements were made at the elementary school level. The second phase was 
completed in the Spring of 1998. 
Prior to the technology plan, the District's educational curriculum was not 
integrated with the stand alone computers. The former lab assistants were not 
integrating the existing technology with the curriculum, but were merely assisting 
students with computer use. 
It was in the period between 1994 and 1998, during the phase-in of the 
technology plan, that the job duties of the lab assistant became more complex. The 
District was not able to train all of its former lab assistants and, as a result, they left the 
District. There was turnover with the new hires because the District's salary for the 
position was low, employees in CSEA's unit did not receive health insurance benefits, 
and employees with computer training were in demand elsewhere. 
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Because of the difficulty in keeping qualified lab assistants, during negotiations 
for the 1995-2000 agreement, the District proposed to CSEA that the District provide 
health insurance benefits for the lab assistants. CSEA declined. During the 1998-1999 
school year, the District again raised the issue and CSEA again declined. 
On June 14, 1999, the District submitted a New Positions Duties Statement to 
the Westchester County Personnel Office in accordance with Civil Service Law (CSL) 
§22. The District sought to reclassify the lab assistants to the newly created title of 
computer aide. On July 9, 1998, the Westchester County Civil Service adopted the title 
of computer aide. 
The former lab assistants were required to have only a high school diploma. 
They were paid on an hourly basis and worked a six and one-half or seven-hour day for 
thirty-six weeks. Their pay ranged from $11,000 to $38,000 for the 1999-2000 school 
year. 
The computer aides' salary during the 1999-2000 school year ranged from 
$21,000 to $26,000, depending on years of service and educational level. The 
computer aide was required to have a Bachelor's degree. They are salaried and work 
the school year (ten months). Their workday is the same as the teachers. They receive 
health insurance benefits. The District filled the position and declined CSEA's request 
that the title be placed in the unit represented by CSEA. 
Since the phase-in of technology in 1998, the computer aides have collaborated 
with the teachers in lesson development. The aides are responsible for instructing the 
students on the proper use of the computers, as well as demonstrating how to navigate 
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through the particular software being integrated into the curriculum. The teacher is 
responsible for curriculum content. The aides also instruct the teachers, administrators 
and staff personnel on the proper use of the computers and software. 
The District argues that the computer aide title should be placed in the unit 
represented by the Rye Teachers' Association (Association), which includes 
Secretarial/Clerical and School Nurses because the terms and conditions of their 
employment are more closely aligned with the employees in the Association's unit than 
with the employees in CSEA's unit. The Association has taken no position on the 
petition and has not participated in these proceedings. 
ALJ DECISION 
The ALJ granted CSEA's petition for unit clarification and, as a result, did not 
reach the merits of the unit placement portion of CSEA's petition.1 
EXCEPTIONS 
The District excepted to the ALJ's decision on the grounds that the ALJ erred in 
granting the clarification aspect of the petition, misapplying the law and the facts. CSEA 
supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
DISCUSSION 
1The ALJ noted that were she to reach the unit placement issue, she would place 
the computer aides in the unit represented by CSEA. 
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The District argues that the ALJ erred when she found that computer aide duties 
have historically been performed by CSEA unit members who share a significant 
community of interest with respect to employment conditions, duties and goals; 
therefore, she found that the computer aide title is encompassed within the CSEA 
bargaining unit. 
We have previously held that "[a] unit clarification petition seeks only a factual 
determination as to whether a job title is actually encompassed within the scope of the 
petitioner's unit. We have held a unit clarification petitioner to a burden of proof on its 
petition because that particular type of petition necessarily seeks only a determination 
of fact."2 A unit clarification petition raises only a fact question as to whether the at-
issue personnel are included in the existing unit.3 Where the language in the 
recognition clause is general and is not title specific, the inquiry goes beyond the 
language of the recognition clause to determine whether any other contractual 
language either covers or specifically excludes the at-issue title.4 Where there is no 
relevant contractual language, the parties' practice with respect to the at-issue title or 
similar titles is reviewed to ascertain the parties' intent.5 
2Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist, 33 PERB U3007, at 3021 (2000), citing State 
of New York (Dep't of Audit and Control), 24 PERB 1J3019 (1991). 
3County of Orange and Sheriff of Orange County, 25 PERBfl3049 (1992), confirmed 
sub nom. Orange County Deputy Sheriff's Ass'n v. PERB, 26 PERB ^7004 (Sup. Ct. 
Rockland County 1993). 
^General Brown Cent. Sch. Dist, 28 PERB 1J3065 (1995); County of Niagara, 
21 PERB H3030(1988). 
5County of Niagara, supra. See also Clinton Comm. Coll., 31 PERB P070 (1998). 
Board - CP-632 -6 
The ALJ's reliance on Monroe-Woodbury Central School Districf is misplaced. 
PERB's decision in Monroe-Woodbury was "limited to a unit clarification petition in 
which the unit is clearly defined in the parties' collective bargaining agreement and the 
title or titles in-issue are specifically made part of the recognition clause, even though 
the parties' practice may have been to exclude the title from subsequent negotiations."7 
Here, CSEA's recognition clause for the unit representing teacher aides and 
teacher assistants expressly omits any reference to the former lab assistants and to the 
new computer aides. Nevertheless, the ALJ used an excerpt from the parties' 
stipulation, i.e., that "the people who were formerly ... teacher assistants, ... assigned to 
the computer labs are now in the positions that are in dispute which are called 
computer aide," to support her conclusion that the lab assistants were one and the 
same with the computer aides and, therefore, included in the recognition clause of the 
CSEA agreement and that Monroe-Woodbury applied. The stipulation referred to by the 
ALJ, however, was in response to the ALJ's inquiry to counsel regarding how the 
transition from teacher assistants to computer aides occurred.8 
The record reflects that a change in title occurred in the late 1998-1999 school 
year when the District took the initiative to have Civil Service change the job 
description. "Shortly after they were designated computer aides the CSEA sought 
6Supra note 2. 
7Id. at 3022. 
8Transcript, pp. 40-42. 
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recognition from the Board [of Education], the Board [of Education] declined and then 
CSEA filed this petition."9 Were we to consider the unit clarification petition only from 
the standpoint of titles, our inquiry would end here. The title computer aide was not, and 
is not, included in CSEA's title specific recognition clause. That the computer aide 
replaced the lab assistants is not dispositive.10 
However, the disposition of a unit clarification petition, such as this one, may not 
end with a reading of the written definition of the unit. It must take into account the 
scope of the existing unit, which allows for the consideration of other factors, such as 
community of interest.11 We have held that the uniting criteria set forth in §207 of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) can be material to the disposition of the 
fact question which underlies the unit clarification petition, but only if and to the extent 
they evidence the actual scope of the bargaining unit.12 
The ALJ concluded that CSEA unit members share a community of interest with 
computer aides because CSEA unit members historically performed computer aide 
duties and because of their common employment conditions, duties and goals. We 
disagree. The former lab assistant's assignment to a computer laboratory is where the 
similarity ends. The former lab assistant's role was limited by both education and 
technology. Their wages were not the same as the computer aides, and they were paid 
9Transcript, p. 42 
™Malone Cent. Sen. Dist, 31 PERB 1J3050 (1998). 
11See, e.g., Lawrence Union Free Sch. Dist, 20 PERB fi4010 (1987). 
12See State of New York (Dep't of Audit and Control), supra note 2. 
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on a different basis, hourly versus salaried. Their duties were not the same except that 
both titles work with the classroom teachers, although the computer aides are involved 
in instructing teachers, and the lab assistants did not. They did not receive health 
benefits, which the computer aides now receive. 
Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the decision of the ALJ on the unit 
clarification petition. Although the ALJ did not reach the unit placement issue, we note 
that there is sufficient evidence in the record and in the ALJ's decision for us to decide 
this issue. 
A unit placement petition is a mini-representation proceeding which puts the 
appropriateness of the unit under §207 of the Act in issue.13 Community of interest and 
administrative convenience are relevant to dispose of the placement issue. Based upon 
the record, the computer aides do not share a community of interest with teacher aides 
and assistants. The record reflects the computer aides are salaried, not hourly, 
employees as are the other titles in CSEA's unit and that their salaries are comparable 
to the school nurses.14 Computer aides are required by the District to have a Bachelor's 
Degree, which is a requirement of the School Nurse title in the Association's unit, but is 
not required of any titles represented by CSEA. The computer aides work on a more 
13W. 
14Note: The record established that the nurses work a seven-hour day with an 
unpaid lunch hour. Their work week is thirty-five hours and their work year is the same as 
teachers. 
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intimate and more equal setting with teachers in integrating curriculum than did the lab 
assistants. 
The other uniting criteria contained in §207 of the Act, administrative 
convenience, was not considered by the ALJ. We have held that "[t]hat criterion 
requires weight be given to an employer's uniting preference."15 In this matter, the 
record discloses that the District had difficulty retaining computer aides after the phase-
in of the new technology in the various schools operated by the District. In an effort to 
keep computer aides who had been fully trained, the District sought to increase their 
benefits by providing health insurance. CSEA rejected this proposal. The other unit 
that provided health insurance and a higher salary scale was the unit represented by 
the Association. The District's stated unit preference must be given due consideration 
where the placement of the computer aide title in the Association's unit is at least as 
appropriate as would be placing the computer aides in CSEA's unit. In this particular 
case, the District's mission is supported by its placement of the computer aides into the 
Association's unit. 
We find, based upon the record before us, that the Association's unit is the most 
appropriate unit into which the computer aides should be placed.16 
15See Malone Cent. Sch. Dist, supra note 10. 
16See Eastern SuffolkBOCES, 32 PERB H4027 (1999); Bay Shore Union Free Sch. 
Dist, 27 PERB 1J4075 (1994). 
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Accordingly, we hereby add the title of computer aide to the Secretarial/Clerical 
and School Nurse unit represented by the Association.17 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition for unit clarification/unit 
placement must be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 16, 2000 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
"Inasmuch as the addition of the computer aides to the Association's unit does not 
bring into question its continuing majority status, no election need be ordered. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAU1000,AFSCME,-AFL-CIO,-ULSTER COUNTY 
LOCAL 856, TOWN OF SHAWANGUNK UNIT, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-19740 
TOWN OF SHAWANGUNK, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (ROBERT REILLY of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
SHAW & PERELSON, LLP (SUSAN G. WHITELY of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Ulster County Local 856, Town of 
Shawangunk Unit (CSEA) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing its improper practice charge which alleged that the Town of Shawangunk 
(Town) violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when 
it unilaterally changed a past practice of paying 100% of the health insurance premiums 
for unit members after their retirement. 
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The ALJ dismissed the charge, finding that the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement covered the subject of the alleged practice.1 We reversed the ALJ, finding 
that the general references to "health insurance" and "retirement" in the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement did not satisfy the Town's duty to negotiate the specific 
subjecLofLretireeJiealthjnsurance bene f i t s ^ 
ALJ to decide, inter alia, whether the record established a past practice with respect to 
retiree health insurance that was changed by the Town.2 
On remand, the ALJ determined that the record before him did not establish a 
past practice of the Town paying 100% of the health insurance premiums for unit 
members who retired.3 CSEA excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred 
in finding that a past practice did not exist. The Town supports the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
It was stipulated by the parties that, in 1984, CSEA was recognized by the Town 
as the bargaining agent for a unit of Town employees. Prior to that time, two Town 
employees had retired in 1978 and 1980, respectively. Their titles corresponded to titles 
that were included in a unit that CSEA was later recognized to represent. The Town 
provided 100% of the health insurance premium for those two employees upon their 
retirement. A third Town employee, whose title was not included in the CSEA 
132PERB 1J4503 (1999). 
232PERBP042(1999). 
333 PERB U4584 (2000). 
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bargaining unit, retired in 1992. That employee was required to pay 35% of the health 
insurance premium upon his retirement, the Town paid the balance. In 1993, the Town 
established with the New York State Department of Civil Service and the New York 
State Employees' Retirement System an employer/employee contribution rate of 
50%/35%,_respectively,-for„health insurance_coverage ofLretired employees. No other 
employees have since retired from the Town. 
In October 1997, a CSEA bargaining unit member asked the Town if it would be 
paying 100% of his health insurance premium upon his retirement. The employee was 
advised by the Town that it would not pay 100% of his health insurance premiums once 
he was retired. In January 1998, the CSEA Labor Relations Specialist spoke with the 
Town Supervisor. CSEA asserted that there was an established past practice of the 
Town paying the entire health insurance premium for retirees and the Town reiterated 
that there was no such practice. The Town suggested that CSEA make a proposal to 
be negotiated regarding health insurance coverage for retirees. The instant improper 
practice charge followed. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, including those made at oral argument, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
DISCUSSION 
"In determining the existence of a past practice, it must be found that the practice 
is unequivocal, has been in existence for a significant period of time and that the 
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employees could reasonably expect the practice to continue without change."4 Here, 
the ALJ determined, on the stipulated record before him, that there was no unequivocal 
past practice of paying 100% of health insurance premiums for retirees established by 
CSEA. We agree. 
- Jlhetwo employees-who_retired inJ978 andJ9&Q_retiredJ}MoreCSEA_became_ 
the recognized bargaining agent. The record shows only that their titles "corresponded" 
with titles that later became part of the CSEA bargaining unit. Based upon these sparse 
facts, we cannot find that there is an unequivocal practice of paying 100% of the health 
insurance premium for bargaining unit retirees. 
CSEA relies upon Auburn Enlarged City School District (hereafter, Auburn),5 in 
support of its argument that a long-standing practice of providing fully paid health 
insurance for retirees may not be unilaterally changed by the employer. CSEA is correct 
in its statement of our holding in that case, but is in error in arguing that the facts are 
identical to the instant case. In Auburn, there had been in existence for nearly twenty 
years an officially adopted Board of Education written resolution providing for the total 
payment by the District of health insurance premiums for retirees. The existence of the 
policy was undisputed. The Board then sought to amend that policy by resolution and 
the District thereafter implemented the amended policy. The District argued that the 
4Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist, 32 PERB 1J3003, at 3005-06 (1999), citing County of 
Nassau, 24 PERB 1J3029 (1991). See also City of Rochester, 21 PERB 1J3040 (1988), 
confirmed, 155 AD2d 1003, 22 PERB 1J7035 (4th Dep't 1989). 
; 525 PERB 1J3055 (1992). 
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management rights and zipper clauses of the parties' collective bargaining agreement 
effected a contract waiver, giving the District the right to make unilateral changes. We 
there found that the two clauses did not establish a waiver of the right to object to a 
unilateral change in practice involving a mandatory subject of negotiation in effect when 
the-contract-was-negotiated. Here,4he-very-existence of-the-practiceJsJnJssue.Jn-fact, 
the Shawangunk Town Board passed its only resolution on the issue of retiree health 
insurance in 1993 setting the retiree's contribution for health insurance at 35%. CSEA's 
reliance on Auburn is, therefore, misplaced. 
CSEA's reliance on Onondaga-Cortland-Madison BOCES? is likewise misplaced. 
That decision involved a violation of §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act.7 The holding in that 
case was based upon the interpretation of an employer's duty under the Act to maintain 
the status quo as to terms and conditions of employment for members of a newly 
certified bargaining unit until a wage and benefit package was fixed by collective 
negotiations with the certified bargaining agent. Here, that obligation has been met. A 
contract was negotiated between the Town and CSEA. No provision was included 
regarding retiree health insurance and no bargaining unit member has retired since the 
unit was recognized and unit employees' terms and conditions of employment were 
negotiated. 
!25 PERB 1J3044 (1992), rev'd on other grounds, 198 AD2d 824, 26 PERB 
1J7015 (4th Dep't 1993), motion for leave to appeal denied, 81 NY2d 706 (1993). 
7lndeed, CSEA has not here alleged a violation of §§209-a.1(a) and (c). 
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We find, on this record, that there is no established past practice of the Town 
paying 100% of the health insurance premiums for retirees from CSEA's bargaining 
unit. We, therefore, deny CSEA's exceptions and affirm the decision of the ALJ.8 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed, 
DATED: November 16, 2000 
Albany, New York 
A^O^. 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
larc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
8Because of our determination herein, we do not reach the Town's other 
defenses. 
[ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PATRICK MICHAEL FLYNN, 
Gharging-Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-20783 
WILLIAM FLOYD UNITED TEACHERS, 
LOCAL 1568, 
Respondent, 
- and -
WILLIAM FLOYD UNION FREE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
PATRICK MICHAEL FLYNN, pro se 
JAMES R. SANDNER (SHERRY B. BOKSER of counsel), for Respondent 
RAINS & POGREBIN (CRAIG OLIVO of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Patrick Michael Flynn to a decision 
of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing his improper practice charge which 
alleged a violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
by the William Floyd United Teachers, Local 1568 (WFUT) when it denied his request 
that the WFUT file a grievance on his behalf and that the WFUT appeal the grievance 
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he thereafter filed to arbitration. The William Floyd Union Free School District (District) 
is made a statutory party to the proceeding pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act. 
The ALJ dismissed Flynn's charge, holding that all the record established was a 
disagreement between a unit member and the union about the merits of a grievance. 
Sucfeua disagreement, the ALJ_held,_absenLevidence of-bad faith_or_evidence that the 
grievant's position is the only possible one, did not rise to the level of a breach of the 
duty of fair representation. 
Flynn excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the facts do not support the 
ALJ's decision. The WFUT responded and supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
Article VII, Section F of the WFUT - District 1998-1999 collective bargaining 
agreement provides that: 
Secondary school teachers will not be assigned more than 
five academic classes each day or twenty-five academic 
periods per week. Teacher academic assignments in excess 
of twenty-five periods per week shall be reimbursed at the 
rate specified in Article XVI, Section E. 
Secondary school teachers will not be required to teach 
more than two certification areas or have more than two 
teaching preparations at any one time except for good and 
justifiable reasons where three teaching preparations are 
acceptable; it being understood that limiting the preparation 
will be a more educationally sound policy. Regents classes 
and non-regents classes in the same subject will be 
considered separate preparations. In view of the science 
teacher's seven periods per week (lab courses), the 
Board - U-20783 -3 
following general schedule is advisable except for good and 
compelling reasons: 
3 - seven per week courses 21 periods per week 
1 - five per week course 5 periods per week 
Total 26 periods per week 
The foregoing schedule is to be arranged by the science 
coordinator in conference with the department concerned. 
Science teachers who teach lab courses (in excess of 
twenty-five periods per week) shall not be assigned 
supervisory duties. 
Flynn is a science teacher in the District who teaches ninth and tenth grade 
classes. In the school year prior to the filing of the instant charge1, he was assigned by 
the District to what is referred to by the parties as a 4-0 schedule, that is he taught a 
science class for four periods per day, with two lab periods per class per week, for a 
total of twenty-eight periods per week. In accordance with Article VII, section F, Flynn 
was assigned no supervisory periods. 
In the Fall of 1998, Flynn read the above contract language regarding extra 
compensation for teaching more than twenty-five periods per week as applying to his 
situation. He met initially with Walter Flaherty, the WFUT grievance chair, and then with 
Ronald Gross, the WFUT unit president, several times in October 1998 about his 
interpretation of the contract language. Flaherty expressed his reservations about the 
grievance Flynn proposed WFUT file on his behalf. Flaherty consulted with Gross, who 
told Flynn repeatedly during their meetings that a grievance seeking extra 
compensation had no chance because the contract language was clear that, as to 
1ln 1998-1999, Flynn taught ninth grade Regents Biology. 
Board - U-20783 -4 
science teachers, the "extra compensation" referred to in the contract, by practice 
between the WFUT and the District, had taken the form of being excused from 
supervisory periods.2 Gross further advised Flynn that there was a long and uniform 
practice in the District of the contract language being interpreted in this way. Other 
science-teachers^occasionally-attended-the_meetings_with Flynn. DuringJhisJimeJrame, 
Gross consulted with Richard Baron, a New York State United Teachers (NYSUT) labor 
relations specialist, who told Gross that Flynn's proposed grievance was without merit. 
Gross suggested to Flynn that he investigate the origin of the contract language 
and gave him access to WFUT records. Flynn discovered an undated document that 
appeared to be a draft proposal of the in-issue contract language. The document 
contained the following language: "teacher academic assignments in excess of 25 
per/week (26 in the case of science teachers) shall be reimbursed at the rate specified 
in Article XIII...." However, the reference to "26 in the case of science teachers" was 
crossed out and was not included in the subsequent contract. Flynn even spoke to Paul 
Scanaliato, a former WFUT president, who, Flynn testified, told him the language was 
only intended to allow the District to assign twenty-six periods of teaching and labs 
without extra compensation if the teacher was relieved of supervisory duties, but that 
any assignment in excess of twenty-six instructional periods was not allowed without 
2Teachers are normally scheduled to teach five periods per day, five days per 
week, and are assigned one duty period per day, for a total of thirty assigned periods 
per week. 
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monetary compensation. Flynn related this information to Gross, who remained 
steadfast in his belief that such an interpretation of the contract language was in error. 
In November 1998, Gross told Flynn he would not file a grievance on his behalf 
because he believed such a grievance was without merit, but he told Flynn that he 
couldfile-the grievance^on his own. Flynn4hereafter-requestedJhaUhe-DistricLpayLhim 
for each of the extra periods he taught per week. When the District declined his request 
on December 3, 1998, Flynn filed a grievance. The District denied the grievance on 
January 11, 1998. In December, Flynn requested that Gross obtain a legal opinion from 
NYSUT on the merits of the grievance. Gross spoke to Baron and then told Flynn that 
Baron also thought the grievance to be without merit. 
Flynn presented further evidence in support of his grievance to Gross in 
December 1998. On January 12, 1999, Flynn was allowed to present his case to the 
WFUT executive board. Gross also presented his position. The executive board passed 
a nonbinding resolution recommending that Gross pursue the grievance to arbitration. 
Gross, who has sole discretion to decide which matters will be grieved, declined to do 
so. At a later general membership meeting of the WFUT, Gross said he would seek 
legal advice from NYSUT and then decide whether the grievance would be pursued. 
Flynn thereafter presented his grievance at step 2 of the contractual grievance 
procedure and the District denied the grievance. On January 22, 1999, Flynn asked 
Gross to take the grievance to arbitration.3 Gross again declined, telling Flynn that the 
3Pursuant to the WFUT-District collective bargaining agreement, only the WFUT 
can appeal a grievance to arbitration. 
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grievance lacked merit, it was not a politically opportune time to pursue such a 
grievance and that it would impair WFUT's position in the upcoming contract 
negotiations. Gross confirmed his position in a letter to Flynn dated February 5, 1999. 
In March 1999, a meeting held at the NYSUT office with Flynn, Gross, Flaherty 
and_Baron,-as_well_as_a.nath.er_s.cien.eeteacher,_and_NYSUT_sregianaLdirector,, 
provided Flynn with the information that Gross had not received a legal opinion from 
NYSUT when he considered the merits of the grievance. Baron explained to Flynn that 
NYSUT counsel did not provide legal interpretations of contracts and that Gross' 
statement that he would get a legal opinion was based upon a misunderstanding. 
DISCUSSION 
To establish a violation of the duty of fair representation under the Act, Flynn 
must demonstrate that WFUT's actions toward him were arbitrary, discriminatory or 
taken in bad faith.4 As the ALJ found, Flynn has failed to meet his burden of proof. 
While Gross from the outset disagreed with Flynn's interpretation of Article VII, 
section F of the contract, Gross listened on several occasions to Flynn's request to 
grieve his concerns about extra compensation for science teachers who were teaching 
in excess of twenty-five periods per week. He researched the request and he explained 
to Flynn his reasons for deciding that the WFUT would not pursue the grievance and, 
later, why the WFUT would not take Flynn's grievance to arbitration. Flynn was given 
4C/V// Service Employees Ass'n v. PERB, 132 AD2d 430, at 432, 20 PERB 
U7024, at 7039 (3d Dep't 1987), aff'd on other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB 1J7017 
(1988). 
Board - U-20783 -7 
access to WFUT records, the WFUT Executive Board, and to Baron, NYSUT's 
representative to assist him in making his case. Gross even advised Flynn that he 
would attempt to address his concerns during the next round of contract negotiations 
with the District.5 
, A union is-not-requiredJo-agreejA/itha-uniLemployee!s interpretation otthe 
contract, although the union must respond to the unit employee's concern or request to 
file a grievance.6 The WFUT responded to Flynn's request, spent time evaluating his 
concerns and informed him of its position and the reasons therefor. We have 
consistently held that we would not substitute our judgment for that of a union's 
regarding the filing and prosecution of grievances, for the union is given a wide range of 
reasonableness in these regards.7 Therefore, even if there is some merit to Flynn's 
position regarding compensation for science teachers who teach or have lab 
assignments in excess of twenty-five periods per week, a conclusion contrary to that of 
the ALJ's would not be warranted. Different interpretations of the clause in issue are 
certainly possible and we do not find Gross's interpretation of Article VII, section F to be 
5ln fact, during negotiations which concluded in December 1999, the District and 
the WFUT agreed to new language that provides for extra compensation for science 
teachers working extra instructional periods. 
Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 500 and Central New York Reg'l Transp. 
Auth., 32 PERB ff3053 (1999). 
7Public Employees Fed'n, AFL-CIO and State of New York (Dep't of Health) 
(Reese), 29 PERB 1J3027 (1996); Dist. Council 37, AFSCME (Gonzalez), 28 PERB 
113062(1995). 
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"patently unreasonable."8 Even if the WFUT erred in its assessment of Flynn's claim, 
the charge would still be dismissed because the record is devoid of any evidence of 
discrimination or bad faith on the part of the WFUT9 and there is no proof that Flynn's 
interpretation of Article VII, section F of the contract is the only one possible.10 
—For4he-reasons-set-forth-above,-we-deny Flynnlsexceptions and we^affirmihe 
decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: November 16, 2000 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
larc A. Abbott, Member 
/JornT. Mitchell, Member 
8Hauppauge Schools Office Staff Ass'n (Haffner), 18 PERB 1(3029, at 3061 
(1985). 
9Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n, Inc., Local 1000, State Univ. College at Buffalo, 
Local 640, 27 PERB 1)3004 (1994). 
10 Supra note 8. 
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In the Matter of 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the Niagara Falls Police Captains 
and Lieutenants Association (Association) to a decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) which found that the Association submitted nonmandatory subjects of 
negotiation to compulsory interest arbitration in violation of §209-a.2(b) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) and directed the Association to withdraw its 
proposals #1 and #13 from consideration of compulsory interest arbitration. 
Based on our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
^ 
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FACTS 
On May 4, 2000, the City of Niagara Falls (City) filed an improper practice 
charge alleging that the Association violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act by including in its 
petition for compulsory interest arbitration two proposals, to wit: proposal #1 and 
proposal-#^,-which-are-nonmandatorysubjects of negotiation. 
The Association, in its answer, argued that the at-issue proposals are 
mandatorily negotiable. 
The matter was submitted to the ALJ upon the stipulated record described in the 
ALJ's letter dated June 12, 2000, consisting of the following: 
1. The Improper Practice Charge filed by the City on May 4, 2000 
and attachments thereto. 
2. The Association's Answer. 
3. The Parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement covering the 
period 1994-1996. 
4. The 1998 Interest Arbitration Award in Case No. IA97-010; 
M96-457. 
5. The following two (2) proposals included in the Association's 
Petition for Interest Arbitration which the City asserts are 
nonmandatory subjects of bargaining: 
(a) Proposal 1 - §4.04 - POSTINGS (NON-COMPETITIVE JOB 
CLASSIFICATION) 
The following to replace existing language: 
(THE SECTION TO BE RETITLED "NON-COMPETITIVE JOB 
CLASSIFICATIONS".) 
In the event the City decides to fill a vacancy in a non-
competitive position, or it creates a new non-competitive 
Board - U-21688 -3 
position, assignment to such vacancy shall be made by the 
City from the three (3) most senior officers who requested 
assignment and who are qualified. The qualifications will be 
fixed by the City and may not be unreasonable. 
By way of example and not by way of limitation, the following 
shall be considered as non-competitive positions: 
Assistant-Superintendent
 r 
Detective Captain, 
Detective Lieutenant, 
NID Captain (formerly CIU Captain), 
NID Lieutenant (formerly CIU Lieutenant), 
Community Services Supervisor, 
Youth Aid Bureau Captain (formerly JAB Captain), 
Youth Aid Bureau Lieutenant (formerly JAB Lieutenant), 
Traffic Supervisor. 
Any position, which has been classified by the Public 
Employment Relations Board as "managerial or confidential" 
shall be excluded from the provisions of this section. 
Notice of vacancy and of such reasonable qualifications 
shall be posted on Department Bulletin Boards and a copy 
shall be provided to the Association for at least thirty (30) 
days before the selection is made. The position shall be 
filled within ten (10) days thereafter. 
In the event of a vacancy in a position, if no supervising 
officer indicates a desire to fill such vacancy it will be filled 
based upon inverse seniority. 
For purposes of this section seniority shall be computed 
based upon the date of appointment to the officer's present 
rank. 
(b) Proposal 13 - §12.06 - ANTICIPATED 
LEGISLATION - [NEW] 
In the event the New York State Legislature authorizes the 
elimination of any restrictions on Tier II employees, the City 
will eliminate such restrictions. 
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ALJ Decision 
The ALJ determined that the Association's proposals #1 and #13 were 
nonmandatory and/or prohibited subjects of bargaining and ordered them withdrawn 
from compulsory interest arbitration. 
— Exceptions — 
The Association excepted to the ALJ's decision on the facts and law. The City 
responded with a brief in support of the ALJ's decision. 
Discussion 
Association Proposal #1 
This proposal replaces existing language in §4.04 Postings, of the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement. The ALJ correctly found that qualifications for a 
position are a management prerogative and, thus, a nonmandatory subject of 
bargaining.1 Proposal #1 also set forth a procedure in which an assignment to a vacant 
position was to be made from the three (3) most senior officers. We have held, and the 
ALJ correctly noted, that the procedures to be used to fill a position, e.g., seniority, are 
a mandatory subject of negotiation.2 
'See City of Buffalo (Police Dep't), 29 PERB fl3023 (1996); Levitt v. The Bd. of 
Collective Bargaining of The City of New York, Office of Collective Bargaining), 21 
PERB H7516 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1988); West Irondequoit Bd. ofEduc, 4 PERB 
113070(1971). 
2See Schenectady Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 21 PERB 1J3022 (1988); 
Dutchess County BOCES Faculty Ass'n, NEA/NY, 17 PERB 1f3120 (1984), confirmed 
122 AD2d 845,19 PERB 1J7018 (2d Dep't 1986); White Plains Police Benevolent Ass'n, 
9PERBP007(1976). 
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We turn to the Association's exceptions to the ALJ's findings based upon the 
stipulated record. 
The Association believes the ALJ erroneously determined that proposal #1 
would require the City to fill a vacant position and was, therefore, nonmandatory. The 
AssoeiatJon^rgues4hat4-he-language-of-proposaJ-#-1-is-dJSGretionary4n-that-the-Gity 
makes the initial decision to fill the vacant position and as such is subject to the duty to 
bargain.3 The problem, however, is that the language of proposal #1 incorporates 
mandatory subjects, e.g., procedure to fill a position, as well as nonmandatory subjects, 
e.g., qualifications, and filling the vacancy within a defined time (ten days). We have 
held that where a bargaining proposal contains two or more inseparable elements, i.e., 
a unitary demand, at least one of which is nonmandatory, the entire proposal is 
deemed nonmandatory.4 Consequently, we do not agree with the Association's 
exception and it is denied. 
The Association believes that the ALJ erred when she found that Association 
proposal #13 was nonmandatory. This proposal would add new §12.06 to the parties's 
collective bargaining agreement Article Xll-Miscellaneous Provisions. The language of 
§12.06 is anticipatory and it refers to amendments to §§302(9)(d) and 443(f) and (f-1) 
of the New York State Retirement and Social Security Law (RSSL). 
3See County of Westchester, 33 PERB 1J3025 (2000) (citing cases). 
.
 4See Police Benevolent Ass'n of the City of White Plains, Inc., 33 PERB 1(3051 
(2000) (citing cases). 
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The language of §443(f-1) is clear that a demand in negotiations for the 
additional pension benefit provided by subdivision (f) of this section shall not be subject 
to compulsory interest arbitration, (emphasis added) Since the legislative intent 
expressed in §443(f-1) is unequivocal, the Association's argument is specious and, 
consequently^bargaining-overthe-subject isforeclosed-by the-language of the-statute. 
Proposal #13 is, therefore, not a mandatory subject of negotiation. The Association's 
exception is denied. 
For the reason set forth above, the ALJ's decision is affirmed and the 
Association's exceptions are dismissed. 
IT IS, HEREBY, ORDERED that the Association withdraw its proposals #1 and 
#13 from consideration at compulsory interest arbitration. 
DATED: November 16, 2000 
Albany, New York _^. 
I R. Cuevas, Chairman 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CHARLES ASAMOAH, 
Gharging-Party, — 
- and - CASE NO. U-20785 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION , LOCAL 100, 
Respondent, 
-and-
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
CHARLES ASAMOAH, pro se 
O'DONNELL, SCHWARTZ, GLANSTEIN, ROSEN, DIPRETA & GOLDSTEIN, 
L.L.P. (DAVID M. GLANSTEIN of counsel), for Respondent 
MARTIN B. SCHNABEL, GENERAL COUNSEL (KIMBERLY WESTCOTT of 
counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Charles Asamoah to a decision of 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing his improper practice charge which 
alleged that the Transport Workers Union, Local 100 (TWU) violated §209-a.2(a) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it placed him at the bottom of a 
seniority list for work assignments and job location picks after he participated in a 
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training program which removed him from the unit for more than twelve months.1 
Asamoah's employer, the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA), was made a 
statutory party to the proceedings pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act. 
The ALJ dismissed Asamoah's charge, finding that Asamoah had failed to prove 
that4he^rWUls-actions-toward-him-violated its-duty-of4air-representation.-The^ALJ 
found that Asamoah had not been treated disparately by the TWU in its assignment of 
his ranking on the seniority list or in notifying unit members of the consequences of 
participating in the training program. 
Asamoah excepts to the ALJ's findings of fact and law, arguing that his trainee 
position was not "out of the unit", therefore, there was no reason for changing his 
seniority date; that the TWU applied its "out of the unit" rule in a discriminatory manner 
in his case; that he had no way of knowing that his trainee position was "out of the unit"; 
and that the examples he gave of disparate treatment were not considered by the ALJ. 
Both TWU and NYCTA support the ALJ's decision, but both argue that Asamoah's 
exceptions are untimely filed. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
1We earlier determined that Asamoah's charge was timely and remanded the 
case to the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) for 
further proceedings consistent with our decision. 32 PERB 1J3062 (1999). 
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FACTS 
Asamoah was hired by the NYCTA, Maintenance Division (Division) in 1991 as a 
cleaner/helper, a title in the unit represented by TWU. In 1995, Asamoah applied for 
and was accepted into a Bus Maintainer Trainee program operated by NYCTA. He 
participated in4he-program-for_approximately_22-months.-Upon-his-completion-of4he 
training in February 1997, Asamoah moved into the title of chassis maintainer, also a 
unit title. In February 1998, Asamoah ascertained that his placement on the seniority list 
prepared by NYCTA and reviewed by the TWU was based upon his 1997 completion of 
training and not his 1991 date of hire by NYCTA. When he questioned his placement on 
the list, he was informed by TWU that he was placed at the bottom of the list based 
upon his new title but on the next year's seniority list he would be restored to his 
original seniority date. In February 1999, the new seniority list was issued and 
Asamoah's placement was still based upon his 1997 seniority date. When he again 
questioned the TWU, he was informed that while he participated in the training 
program, he was "out of the unit" because the trainee title was not a title represented by 
the TWU. He was further informed that, pursuant to TWU policy, employees who were 
"out of the unit" for more than a year lost their Division seniority, although they retained 
their Company seniority, which was their original date of hire. 
Asamoah alleges that he was never told that he would be "out of the unit" while 
he participated in the training program and that he was never told that he would lose his 
Division seniority if he was "out of the unit" for more than a year. 
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The TWU introduced evidence that in 1991 the Division members of TWU had 
adopted a policy that the date of hire into a Division title would represent the Division 
seniority date for purposes of picking schedules, locations and vacations. The new 
policy also provided that if a unit member accepted employment in a job title that was 
out-of4he-Division fora-period-of time-greater-than-one-year,-the-employee would lose 
Division seniority and would receive a new seniority date upon return to a TWU-
represented Division title. The TWU also introduced evidence at the hearing that it had 
informed unit employees by flyer at the time of the inception of the training program in 
1995 that unit employees would lose their status as unit employees while participating 
in the program as Bus Maintainer Trainees.2 Asamoah's new seniority date was 
consistent with his date of re-entry into the Division. 
While Asamoah named other employees in his direct testimony whom he 
believed should have been placed lower on the seniority list than he was in 1999, his 
testimony was refuted by TWU's evidence that those employees had either not been 
out of the Division for more than twelve months or had greater Division seniority than 
Asamoah based upon his break in service. 
DISCUSSION 
Initially, we decide the timeliness arguments made by both the TWU and the 
NYCTA. They allege that Asamoah's exceptions, filed on September 23, 2000, are 
2ln fact, TWU's notice to employees urges them to refrain from participating in 
the training program until the unit placement of the trainee title was resolved between 
the TWU and the NYCTA. 
Board - U-20785 -5 
untimely because they were filed more than fifteen working days after Asamoah's 
receipt of the ALJ's decision.3 However, our records reveal that Asamoah received the 
ALJ's decision by certified mail on September 2, 2000. His exceptions, filed on 
September 23, 2000, are, therefore, timely. 
Turning to the-merits-of4he-exceptions,-we determine-that Asamoah^scharge 
must be dismissed. In order to establish a violation of the duty of fair representation , a 
charging party must prove that the employee organization acted in a manner that was 
arbitrary, discriminatory or motivated by bad faith.4 Asamoah has failed to prove that he 
was singled out for disparate treatment or that the TWU acted negligently or in bad faith 
with respect to Asamoah's seniority. TWU's practice with respect to Company seniority 
and Division seniority is long-standing and there is no evidence that it has been 
implemented in a discriminatory manner.5 Further, the record established that the title of 
3Rules of Procedure, §213.2(a). 
4Civil Service Employees Ass'n, Local 1000 v. PERB and Diaz, 132 AD2d 430, 
20 PERB 1J7024, at 7039 (3d Dep't 1987), aff'd on other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 
PERB 1J7017 (1988). 
5See Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 342 (Lynch), 22 PERB 1J3058 (1989), 
where we held that "[l]t is well established that a breach of the duty of fair 
representation is established only by proving that an employee organization's decisions, 
including those which adversely affect some portion of its membership, were made in 
an arbitrary manner, for discriminatory reasons, or in bad faith. The long accepted 
broad iatitude given employee organizations in the negotiations process is particularly 
understood in the negotiation of seniority provisions in which, by definition, some 
employees are advantaged and others are not." See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 
345 US 330, 31 LRRM 2548 (1953). As we have held: "[Tjhe duty of fair representation 
does not preclude an employee organization from reaching agreements in negotiations 
that are more favorable to some unit employees than to others." UFT Local 2, AFT, 18 
PERB 1J3048, at 3105 (1985). 
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Bus Maintainer Trainee was not in the unit represented by TWU and that TWU notified 
unit employees of the representation status of the trainee position at the time the 
program was introduced. That Asamoah was unaware of the unrepresented status of 
the Bus Maintainer Trainee title or the impact of accepting that position on his seniority 
within-the Division-may notb^^ 
TWU.6 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny Asamoah's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: November 16, 2000 
Albany, New York 
Michael'R. Cuevas, Chairman 
bbott, Member 
Mitchell, Member 
) 
'Amalgamated Transit Union, supra note 5. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the Westchester County 
Correction Officers Benevolent Association, inc. (COBA) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its improper practice charge alleging that 
the County of Westchester (County) violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally subcontracted exclusive bargaining unit 
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duties of guarding New York State (State) inmate-patients housed in Ward 29 of the 
Westchester Medical Center to the State of New York (Department of Correctional 
Services) (DOCS). 
FACTS 
— Xhe-record establishes-that,_priorJo_1998,-Ward_29j/vas^a secure medical ward 
in the Department of Hospitals of the County of Westchester located in the Westchester 
County Medical Center building. The medical center was owned and operated by 
Westchester County. 
On February 11,1997, the New York State Legislature amended the New York 
Public Authorities Law by adding a new Article 10-C, Title 1, which created the 
Westchester County Health Care Corporation (WCHCC). Effective January 1, 1998, 
the Department of Hospitals ceased to exist as a County department. 
Pursuant to the parties' Stipulation, the County of Westchester submitted to the 
ALJ a copy of the operating certificate issued by the New York State Department of 
Health to the WCHCC. The certificate authorized the WCHCC to operate the 
Westchester Medical Center. 
At the hearing, the only witness to testify was the current president of COBA, 
Joseph Spano, a corrections officer employed by the Westchester County Department 
of Corrections (Westchester DOC). Spano acknowledged that DOCS ceased sending 
State inmates to Ward 29 in about 1986, and that there were no DOCS inmates on 
Ward 29 from 1986 to July 1, 1999. 
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Effective July 1, 1999, through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed 
by the DOCS Commissioner, Westchester DOC Commissioner and authorized 
personnel of both St. Agnes Hospital and WCHCC, outside hospital beds were made 
available to both DOCS and Westchester DOC.1 
DOCS,-inaccordance-with-Correction-Law-§23(2), operates a-ten=bed secure 
unit in St. Agnes Hospital located in White Plains, New York. WCHCC, as the operator 
of Westchester Medical Center, agreed to permit Westchester DOC to operate a 
fourteen-bed secure unit at the Westchester Medical Center (Ward 29), including five 
beds that were exclusively used for the medical care of federal inmates. Consequently, 
Westchester DOC agreed to permit DOCS' inmate-patients to be admitted into Ward 29 
and, vice versa, DOCS agreed to permit Westchester DOC inmate-patients to be 
admitted into the secure unit at St. Agnes Hospital. The MOU expressly provided that 
DOCS was to "maintain care, custody and supervision of said inmate-patients 
throughout their placement in Ward 29, consistent with all applicable laws and with the 
Medical Staff Bylaws and the policies and procedures of Westchester Medical Center." 
The same admonition applied to Westchester DOC whenever it utilized beds at St. 
Agnes' secure unit. In effect, each agency was responsible for guarding their 
respective inmates regardless of which secure medical unit they were admitted to. 
1See DOCS' Answer. 
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The parties further agreed that WCHCC could at its option cancel this agreement 
with thirty days written notice. The MOU was effective for one year, with the option to 
extend the term. 
Robert L. Page, Assistant Warden of the Westchester DOC, sent a memo, dated 
June-25,J999,Jo-alLstaflregardingsecurity._Rage advised staff that: :— 
1. Effective July 1, 1999, Westchester County Department of Correction 
(County) will be using Saint Agnes Hospital in White Plains instead of the 
Westchester Medical Center for all hospital services . . . . 
2. The State will co-use the secure ward (Ward 29) at the Medical Center with 
the County. 
a. County staff will continue to be assigned for the care, custody and 
supervision of the U.S. Marshal's Service (Federal) inmate-patients 
housed on Ward 29. 
b. State staff will also be assigned for the care, custody and supervision of 
State inmate-patients also housed on Ward 29. 
c. County rules and regulations will prevail for both Federal and State 
inmates, as well as County and State Staff. 
On September 23, 1999, COBA filed this improper practice charge alleging inter 
alia: "Ward 29 at the Westchester Medical Center has been and still is in the exclusive 
control of the County of Westchester." 
A hearing was scheduled on the charge for March 21, 2000. At that hearing, 
Spano was COBA's only witness. COBA argues in its charge that the County has 
unilaterally subcontracted exclusive bargaining unit duties, specifically, guarding State 
inmate-patients housed in Ward 29 of the Westchester Medical Center. In support of its 
argument, COBA offered the testimony of its president, Spano, who testified about his 
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knowledge of the security for inmate-patients on Ward 29. Spano claimed he never 
observed a DOCS corrections officer actually guarding a state prisoner on Ward 29 nor 
was he aware of any such arrangement from conversations with his fellow corrections 
officers assigned to Ward 29.2 Spano did admit, however, that DOCS ceased sending 
State inmate-patientsJoJA/ard_29^in 19S6._Consequently,Jherej/VBre no-StateJnmate-
patients on Ward 29 from 1986 to 1999. At the conclusion of the COBA's direct case, 
both the County and DOCS moved to dismiss the charge. The ALJ denied their 
motions. A subsequent hearing date was adjourned and the parties stipulated to 
submit briefs in support of their positions and to allow the County to submit the 
Operating Certificate as an exhibit to its brief. 
ALJ DECISION 
On September 18, 2000, the ALJ rendered his decision dismissing the charge. 
The ALJ found that, although the Westchester DOC issued the June 25, 1999 memo 
which contradicted the alleged practice described by Spano, the Correction Law pre-
empted negotiation over the alleged unilateral change in practice. 
EXCEPTIONS 
COBA excepted to the ALJ's decision on the law. In its exceptions, COBA 
contends that the ALJ's conclusion is incorrect. COBA argues that Ward 29 does not fit 
the definition of an outside hospital referred to in §23(2) of the Correction Law. COBA 
contends that Ward 29 is not an outside hospital because it is part of a local 
2He testified that during his eighteen-year career, he worked shifts at Ward 29 on 
and off only about six times. 
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correctional facility as defined in §40 of the Correction Law. COBA argues that Ward 
29 is a hospital prison ward effectively "part and parcel o f the Westchester County 
Correctional Facility. 
DISCUSSION 
Based-upon-Our_review_ofJhe record-and our_consideration_otthe_parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
The record establishes that as of January 1, 1998, Ward 29 was no longer under 
the control of Westchester County. Rather, it was under the control of the WCHCC as 
evidenced by the operating certificate issued by the New York State Health Department 
and by the amendment to the Public Authorities Law, to which judicial notice was 
properly taken. Westchester DOC and DOCS entered into a reciprocal MOU effective 
July 1, 1999 to provide medical services to inmate-patients at both Ward 29 and St. 
Agnes. What is clear from this MOU is that the County is not in exclusive control of 
Ward 29. because it is WCHCC that has agreed to permit Westchester DOC to operate 
a 14-bed secure unit.3 Furthermore, pursuant to the MOU, DOCS is responsible for the 
care, custody and supervision of State inmate-patients at Ward 29. 
COBA also contends in its exception that State inmates assigned to Ward 29 are 
not assigned to an "outside hospital" because, if they were, the Chief Officer of the 
"outside hospital" would be responsible for the supervision of the inmate-patient. COBA 
3Underthe terms and conditions imposed by WCHCC and the hospital by-laws. 
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relies on a 1932 Attorney General's opinion.4 The authority for this opinion is 
Corrections Law §508; however, this section has been amended since 1932 to 
eliminate the Chief Officer as the responsible party. The new §508 requires that "the 
prisoner be kept in the custody of the officials in charge of the jail to which he is 
committedjjntiLhe^has_su1lc^ 
of the statutory amendments and the MOU, this argument fails. 
Lastly, COBA argues, in the alternative, that Correction Law §508(2) allows the 
sheriff to remove an inmate from a local correctional facility to receive medical attention 
at an outside hospital. Ward 29 is part of the local correctional facility; §508 permits 
transfers to "outside hospitals" when the medical facilities at Ward 29 are inadequate to 
treat the inmate-patient. Thus, COBA argues, since §508 is modeled after §23, the 
same rule should apply, i.e., Ward 29 is not an "outside hospital" but part of the 
Westchester County Department of Corrections so that §23 is not applicable to the 
situation at bar. 
Again, COBA's argument fails because it ignores the ownership and control of 
Ward 29. In order for COBA's argument to have merit, Ward 29 would have to be 
owned and operated by the County or Westchester DOC and this is not the case. 
41932 0p. ofAtty. Gen'l 293. 
Correction Law §508(1). 
Board - U-21137 -8 
The essence of COBA's charge, subcontracting, has been characterized as the 
reassignment of unit work [Westchester DOC] to nonunit employees [DOCS].6 The test 
that the Board has employed to determine whether there has been a unilateral transfer 
of unit work was announced in Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority:7 
1 WhetherLthe at-issue workJiad been performed exclusively by unit 
employees, and 
2. Whether the reassigned tasks are substantially similar to those previously 
performed by unit employees. 
In Town of West Seneca, 19 PERB fl3028 (1986), the Board discussed the issue 
of exclusivity and recognized that work may be considered exclusive unit work, even if, 
at times, it is performed by nonunit employees. The principle of "defined perimeters" 
around the nonunit work was amplified and was later referred to as "discernible 
boundary" in Indian River Central School District, 20 PERB 1J3047 (1987). In recent 
years, the Board refined the discernible boundary precedent by introducing the theory 
of the "core components" of the work at issue.8 In Town of Brookhaven, it was noted, 
however, that this Board has "not recognized a discernible boundary when we have 
been unable to identify a reasonable relationship between the components of the 
discernible boundary and the duties of unit employees."9 The definition of unit work may 
6See Public Sector Labor and Employment Law, Lefkowitz, Osterman and 
Townley, 1998 New York State Bar Association, p. 478. 
718 PERB 1J3083 (1985). 
8County of Westchester, 31 PERB ^3034 (1998). 
'27 PERB P063, at 3147 (1994). 
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also, if warranted, include specific location at which the work is performed.10 To include 
work location in the definition of unit work, there must be an identifiable, reasonable 
relationship between the work site and the duties performed by unit employees.11 
Since it is the charging party that bears the burden of proof to establish by a 
preponderence__oLtheLteliable^evidenceJhat a changeLin the_past practLce_had,jn jact, 
occurred,12 our inquiry focuses, therefore, on the duties actually performed by 
Westchester DOC officers.13 COBA's evidence on this issue consists solely of Spano's 
testimony which is devoid of any details regarding the duties he actually performed. In 
fact, Spano's recollection is limited by his lack of work assignments to Ward 29. 
Furthermore, Spano admitted that he did not know whether the County turned over 
Ward 29 to the WCHCC.14 To the extent that Spano testified that Westchester DOC 
officers had guarded State inmates in Ward 29 at some time prior to 1986, we find that 
the unit work, as defined, is the guarding of Westchester DOC inmates at all locations 
at which they are receiving medical treatment, and the guarding of State DOCS 
prisoners when receiving treatment at a facility solely under the County's control. 
^Hudson CitySch. Dist, 24 PERB K3039 (1991); City of Rochester, 21 PERB 
1J3040 (1988), confirmed, 155 AD2d 1003, 22 PERB 1(7035 (4th Dep't 1989). 
"Union-Endicoit Cent. Sen. Dist, 26 PERB 1(3075 (1993), rev'd on other 
grounds, sub nom Board of Educ. of Union-Endicott Cent. Sch. Dist. v. PERB, 197 
AD2d 276, 27 PERB 1(7005 (3d Dep't 1994), leave to appeal denied, 84 NY2d 803, 27 
PERB lf7012 (1994). 
12See State of New York, 33 PERB K3024 (2000) (and cases cited therein). 
13See County of Westchester, 31 PERB 1(3033, at 3072 (1998). 
See Transcript, pp 39-40. 
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The record is clear that Ward 29 ceased to be a facility under the jurisdiction of 
the County as of January 1, 1998. After that date, Ward 29 was under the jurisdiction 
of WCHCC. The last DOCS inmate-patient to be treated in Ward 29 was in 1986. 
COBA, through Spano, failed to describe the duties actually performed by Westchester 
DJDJC_offiaers atJ/Vad^ 
establish exclusivity over the work here in-issue; the guarding of State DOCS prisoners 
at facilities which are not operated or controlled by the County. As the guarding of State 
DOCS prisoners is not the exclusive unit work of Westchester DOC officers, the County 
was free to enter into the MOU with State DOCS and WCHCC regarding the 
supervision of inmates housed for Ward 29. Therefore, the charge must be dismissed. 
COBA's charge also fails because Correction Law §23(2) expressly states that 
the Commissioner of Corrections may permit inmates to be treated in outside hospitals. 
"[Those] inmates shall remain under the jurisdiction and in the custody of the 
department while in said outside hospital and said superintendent. . . shall enforce 
proper measures in each case to safely maintain such jurisdiction and custody." 
(emphasis added) 
We believe that the New York Court of Appeals in Board of Education of the City 
School District of the City of New York v. PERES**5 has determined, under certain 
circumstances, such as those presented here, that the Legislature has plainly and 
clearly removed the obligation to bargain. The Court of Appeals noted: 
1575 NY2d 660, 23 PERB 117012, at 7014 (1990). 
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[C]ertain decisions of an employer though not without impact 
upon its employees, may not be deemed mandatorily negotiable 
"terms and conditions of employment," either because they are 
inherently and fundamentally policy decisions relating to the 
primary mission of the public employer or because the Legislature 
has manifested an intention to commit these decisions to the 
discretion of the public employer. . . . 
The-MOU-acknowledgesthat the County and Westchester_DOC have ceded 
their jurisdiction over Ward 29 to WCHCC. The Page Memorandum of June 25,1999 
merely confirms the parties' understanding that Ward 29 is an independent entity and 
Westchester DOC and DOCS are willing to share bed space under the express terms 
that DOCS supervise its own inmate-patients as required by Correction Law §23(2); 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny COBA's exceptions and affirm the ALJ's 
decision. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: November 16, 2000 ^ ~ - N 
Albany, New York ^ ] A A ^ U < J l (2jC2jl^, 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
iJohn T. Mitchell, Member 
^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASENO.C-5011 
TOWN OF LLOYD, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, , 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5011 
Included: HMEO, Laborer, Mechanic, Foreman, Highway Secretary, Transfer 
Station Attendant, Working Supervisor, Motor Equipment Operator 
(MEO), Senior Plant Operator, Plant Operator, Water/Sewer 
Maintenance, Water/Sewer Foreman, Water/Sewer Asst. Foreman, 
Senior Accountant, Clerk/Typist, Water/Sewer Superintendent, 
Typist/Planning/ZBA, Typist, Building Dept. Secretary, 
TH-Custodian-P/T,-P/T-Building-lnspector,P/T Zoning-Inspector, 
Court Clerk. 
Excluded: All other Town employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: November 16, 2000 
Albany, New York 
^^^i^iyV^<-jJlI^~^ti 
Mifihael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
